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The Supreme Court and the Political

Question: Affirmation or Abdication?*
RALPH

J. BEAN, JR.**

Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is

not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.-De Tocqueville, Democracy in America.

Although more than 100 years have elapsed since the young
Frenchman Alexis De Tocqueville made this observation, its accuracy has not been disproved by a century of American democracy
at work. Indeed, the truth of his remark may have prompted Justice
Frankfurter to express "disquietude that the line is often very thin
between cases in which the Court felt compelled to abstain from
adjudication because of their 'political' nature, and the cases that
so frequently arise in applying the concepts of 'liberty' and
'equality'.'"
Today that line has been worn even thinner. Recent Supreme
Court decisions seem actually to have erased the line for all practical
purposes by placing certain aspects of the political question in a
position of subservience to concepts of individual liberty and
equality. The significance of these decisions lies not only in new
substantive norms which have been created but also in the crippling
blow that has been dealt to what is perhaps the most ancient and
"potentially the widest and most radical avenue of escape from
adjudicaion" in the federal courts.'
In terms of age the political question claims an ancestry which
began prior to the birth of the American institution of judicial review.
* This article represents a condensed version of a paper presented in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for 'The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review" Seminar at the Law School, Harvard University, April 10, 1967.
** A.B., 1963, J.D., 1966, W. Va. University; LL.M., 1967, Harvard
University; Member, W. Va., Va., and D.C. Bars.
I Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, 69 HIv.L. REV.
217, 2227-28 (1955).
The quoted portion is taken from Bickel, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 40, 45 (1961).
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In Hayburn's Case' the Court took under advisement an attempt to
mandamus a federal circuit court to accept pension applications of
disabled war veterans, war orphans and widows and to recommend
eligible applicants to the Secretary of War as provided by an act
of Congress.4 Although the case was never decided by the Supreme
Court because Congress subsequently amended the statute, letters
and memoranda of the circuit court judges reported in a note to the
report of Hayburn'sCase question the constitutionality of the statute.
The justices emphasized that the division of the federal government
into three independent and distinct branches forbade encroachment
by one branch upon the duties of another. It was felt that the act
assigned duties to the circuit courts which they could not constitutionally perform because the duties were not judicial tasks; subsequent
review by another branch of government was thought to be inconsistent with the very nature of judicial power.5
Although Hayburn's Case was not technically a political question
case, refusal by the federal courts to perform a function thought to
be committed by the Constitution to another department of government is strongly reminiscent of the political question. Furthermore,
the concern expressed for preservation of separation of powers has
been the traditional explanation for the political question.
Ten years after the decision in Hayburn's Case the political question doctrine received express recognition in Marbury v. Madison6
when Chief Justice Marshall stated that the federal courts will not
adjudicate political questions even though such questions involve
actual controversies. Thus, by the time the institution of judicial
review was established, the doctrine that an issue is nonjusticiable
because its determination is committed to one of the so-called political
departments of government-the executive or legislative-was given
content.'
32 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).

4 Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 243. The act suspended
prior acts of Congress which barred certain claims for pensions and made
additional provision for pensions for certain disabled veterans. Application
was to be made to the federal circuit courts which were to determine the
degree of disability and to certify the information to the Secretary of War
who was at liberty to disregard a name placed on the pension list by a court.
5 The justices of the circuit court for the district of New York agreed to
administer the act in the capacity of commissioners while the justices for the
districts of North Carolina and Pennsylvania refused to proceed in any
capacity.
6 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-66 (1803).
7
The roots of the political question reach deep into English law.
Development of the doctrine probably began with the Duke of York's Claim
to the Crown (1460) (reported in 1 Wambaugh, Cases on Constitutional
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Establishment of the political question doctrine as a part of
American constitutional law, however, is only the beginning of the
story. The generality of a doctrine forbidding justiciability because
it is the prerogative of another branch of government to make the
determination has proved to be readily adaptable to a great variety
of circumstances. Moreover, the political question has tended to lend
itself to a general policy of judicial self-restraint.
As a consequence of its general applicability and the negative
results that flow from its use, the political question has been applied
broadly to a variety of seemingly unrelated subject matter. These
have ranged from the exclusion and deportation of aliens to the
legal status of Indian tribes and to the apportionment of governments.
Thus, it is not surprising that the amorphism of the doctrine has
provoked a barrage of critical commentary. As one writer has
charged, "[t]he term 'political question' is . . . one of the least

satisfactory terms known to law. The origin, scope and purpose of
the concept elude all attempts at precise statement."8
It is in this setting that recent decisions of an activist court have
eliminated the doctrine as an obstacle in some areas while reducing
its significance in others. Bond v. Floyd9 is perhaps the most current
decision having negative implications for the political question
doctrine. Julian Bond, a Negro, was duly elected as representative
to the Georgia House of Representatives from the 136th House
district. A civil rights organization of which Bond was a member
Law 1 (1915) ) in which the judges refused to consider the Duke's suit to
have himself declared the rightful heir to the throne.
Perhaps the most significant English case having bearing on the political
question was Nabob of the Carnaticv. East India Co., 1 Ves. Jr. 370 (1791),
2 Ves. Jr. 56 (1793). Suit was brought against the East India Company for
having breached a contract with the Nabob. The court reasoned that the
East India Company was acting as a delegate of the sovereign power of
England in making contracts with potentates and for this reason the matter
could not be decided by a court of law. More than any other decision the
Nabob of the Carnaticis said to have established the political question doctrine
as part of English law. See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HAnv.
L. REv. 338 (1924).
The influence of the English decisions must have been felt in the
development of the American counterpart to the doctrine, as the Nabob is
cited in Luther v. Borden, 4 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) which is one of the
earliest of the leading American cases applying the doctrine of judicial
non-interference with political questions. The Borden decision was the first
of a long line of cases from which emerged the rule that the constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government is not enforceable in the
courts. A subsequent portion of this paper is devoted to these cases.
8FRANK, PoLIcAL QuEsnoNs, IN SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAw
80 (Calm ed. 1954).
9 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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and officer issued a statement criticizing United States Government
policy in Vietnam and United States draft laws; Bond publicly
endorsed the statement.
Before the Georgia House convened, House members challenged
Bond's right to be seated. A special committee appointed to hear
the matter concluded that Bond did not support the Constitution of
the United States or of the state of Georgia, that he adhered to the
enemies of the state of Georgia and gave comfort to the enemies
of the United States, that his statements violated the Selective Service
laws of the United States, and that his statements would bring discredit and disrespect to the Georgia House. When the House adopted
the committee report and voted not to allow Bond to take the oath
of office or to be seated as a House member, Bond brought an
action in the appropriate federal district court for injunctive relief
and a declaratory judgment that the House action was not authorized
by the Georgia constitution and violated his rights under the first
amendment to the Federal Constitution. Two members of the
three-judge federal district court concluded the action of the Georgia
House was proper, and Bond appealed directly to the United States
Supreme Court.
Reversing the three-judge court, a unanimous Supreme Court
rejected the state's argument that there should be no judicial review
of a state legislature's power to judge whether or not a prospective
member may conscientiously take the oath required by the state and
Federal Constitutions and concluded that the controversy was justiciable. Addressing itself to the merits of the controversy, the Court
held that disqualification on account of statements Bond had made
violated the free speech provisions of the first amendment which are
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment."°
The Bond case is significant because it represents the first time
in American constitutional history that a federal court has interferred with a state legislature's decision regarding membership in
the legislature. Such questions were heretofore considered nonjusticiable because of separation of powers conceptualism; i.e.,
decisions of a legislature pertaining to its membership have tradi10 The Court stated that "l1]egislators have an obligation to take positions
on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully
informed by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office;
also so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person they
have elected to represent them." Id. at 136.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss2/2

4

Bean: The Supreme Court and Political Question: Affirmation or Abdicati

1969]

THE POLITICAL QUESTION

tionally been considered nonjusticiable political questions." Thus,
the Bond case is unique; yet it is not surprising because the groundwork had already been laid for it by the Court, notably in the
landmark decision of Baker v. Carr."
Baker held justiciable a suit under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to compel reapportionment of a state
legislature in which representation was not based on numerical
equality in voting power. In deciding Baker the Court was confronted
with a respectable line of adverse precedent which was anchored
to the political question doctrine.
As a result of the Court's treatment, the future of the political
question doctrine will probably be confined primarily to conflicts
between the federal judiciary and coordinate branches of the federal
government. Partly for this reason the recent refusal of the House
of Representatives to seat Representative Adam Clayton Powell is
likely to be treated as a political question in the event the case is
decided by the Supreme Court. 3 According to the Court, the relationship between state governments and the federal judiciary cannot
raise a political question unless judicially discoverable standards
are found to be lacking, and, as the Bond and Baker cases illustrate,
the Court has little difficulty discovering standards where concepts
of individual liberty and equality are involved.
Given the tendency of the present Court to limit the application
of the political question doctrine, it seems appropriate to consider
what distinguishes nonjusticiable political issues from justiciable
issues. Is the political question doctrine required by the Constitution
or is it a mere technique of avoidance by which the Court screens
cases which it deems appropriate for decision by other departments
of government? Or is there a more subtle quality to the doctrine
1113 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1317 (1966). In 1920 five New York socialists
were suspended from the New York Legislature because of their opposition
to United States participation in World War I. When the Bond story became
news, a writer for the New York Times interviewed Louis Waldman (one of
the five) and inquired why no redress' had been sought in the courts. He
received this reply: 'We regarded the concept of separation of powers . . .
as far more important than our own case ....
If judges can decide who can
sit in the legislature, they can decide who shouldn't sit. This would be a much
greater offense to democratic government than anything a stupid majority
might do in an individual case." N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1966, at 18, col. 1
(city ed.).
12 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13 The Powell case is discussed in greater detail in a subsequent portion
of this paper beginning at page 132.
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which is somehow related to the role which courts should play in a
democracy?
EXPLANATION AND PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE

The Classical Explanation
As previously mentioned, the political question has traditionally
been explained in terms of judicial respect for the principle of
separation of powers. 4 For Professor Wechsler this means that,
"all the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called
upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another
agency of government the autonomous determination of the issue
raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation." 5 According
to Wechsler, a judicial decision not to adjudicate the merits of a
particular controversy conforms with Marbury v. Madison in that
it amounts to a constitutional adjudication that the matter in question
is vested in the uncontrolled discretion of another department of
government.
Wechsler does concede the Court's discretion to grant or to deny
review of judgments of lower courts whenever the jurisdictional
statute permits certiorari but fails to provide for an appeal. Even
so, he is quick to note that the Court has defined standards for the
exercise of its discretion' 6 and argues for "their faithful application."' 7
Beyond this, Wechsler would favor greater elimination of the Court's
discretion through revision of the applicable jurisdictional statutes.
Thus, he finds comfort in the following dicta in Cohens v. Virginia:
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid
a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful, with whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulty, a case may be attended. We
must decide if it be brought before us. We have no more right
'4 See, e.g., Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925).
Weston describes a political question as "one which is by law for the determination of the executive or legislative departments, or possibly of the
people themselves .... [Tlhe line between judicial and political questions ...
is the line drawn by the constitutional delegation, and none other." Id. at 331.
,5Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.

L. REv.
1, 7 (1959).
' 6 U.S. SUp. Cr. R. 19.
17 Wechsler, supra note 15, at 11.
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to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be
18
treason to the Constitution.
As examples of proper judicial abstention resulting from acts of
constitutional interpretation, Wechsler mentions the Senate's constitutional power to try impeachment cases, the power of each House
of the Congress to seat or to expel members19 and the guarantee of
a republican form of government. An additional example is the
constitutional power of Congress to make or alter state regulations
of the "[m]anner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives"2 which operates to exclude courts from considering constitutional objections to state gerrymanders. 2
Wechsler's explanation of the political question doctrine is wedded
to an elaboration of the so-called classical theory of judicial review
which denies judicial discretion to withhold judgment upon a matter
properly before the Court.2 2 In articulating the classical theory,
18 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
19 Wechsler, supra note 15, at 8. One writer has suggested quite properly

that these examples are unique because the functions to be performed pursuant to the grants of power are essentially adjudicative. Scharpf, Judicial
Review and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YAL L.J. 517,
539 (1966). The recent expulsion of Representative Adam Clayton Powell
by the House of Representatives may test Wechsler's assertion that actions
of either house of Congress in seating or expelling members are political
questions. The relevant constitutional language is as follows: "Each House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members. . . . Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrance
of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, see. 5. The Powell
case is dealt with in more detail in the concluding portion of this paper.
2oU.S. CONST.

art. I, § 4.

21 Wechsler, supra note 15, at 8. Whatever validity there once may have
been in this proposition, it is today in serious need of qualification. Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) invalidated state racial gerrymandering
used to deprive Negroes of the right to vote in a municipal election. More
recently, the Court decided the merits of a claim alleging that voting districts
created by the New York legislature were motivated by racial considerations.
Wright v. Rockfeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Although the relief prayed for
by the plaintiffs was denied, the result did not rest on the political question
doctrine
22 but upon the insufficiency of evidence to prove the allegations.
The classical theory draws heavily upon the following language in
Marbury v. Madison:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial departments
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So,
if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution;
or conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this is of
the very essence of judicial duty. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Wechsler was responding in part to Judge Hand's assertion that the
Court is free to adjudicate a constitutional objection or to decline
to do so when a case is properly before the Court, according to
"how importunately the occasion demands an answer." 23 In fact,
Judge Hand viewed the political question as an illustration of the
kind of discretion he thought was involved in judicial review24 and
alluded to the doctrine as a "stench in the nostrils of strict constructionists." 25
The Political Question and the "Passive Virtues"
Concurring with Judge Hand's disagreement with Wechsler is
Professor Bickel who declares that it is a play on words to say that
the broad discretion which the Court has exercised may be explained
solely in terms of constitutional interpretation.2 Bickel's emphasis,
however, differs from Hand's. For Professor Bickel, judicial review
is justified by the value to society with results from the Court's
capacity to define and pronounce principles of the community.2
The thrust of the Bickel analysis is upon "passive virtues"-techniques employed by the Court to avoid the exercise of judicial review,
whenever, in the Court's prudential judgment, a principled decision
on the merits is not possible. Among these techniques the political
question occupies the seat of honor. Stated in Bickel's words: "[tjhe
culmination of any progression of devices for withholding the ultimate
constitutional judgment of the Supreme Court-and in a sense their
sum-is the doctrine of political questions." 2
According to Bickel, the political question doctrine "resists being
domesticated" in the fashion suggested by Professor Wechsler:
There is something different about it, in kind, not in degree,
from the general 'interpretative process'; something greatly
more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not
principle. And it is something which cannot exist within the
four corners of Marbury v. Madison."'
23

24

2

L.HAND, THE BiLL
Id.at 15-18.

51d.
26

OF RiGHTS

15 (1958).

at 15.

Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 46

(1961).
27

A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 23-28 (1962). For a
criticism of Professor Bickel's thesis, see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review,
28 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
A. BICKEL, supranote 27, at 463.
29
Bickel, supra note 26, at 46.
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Bickel does not deny that the political question may sometimes be
adequately explained as an act of constitutional interpretation. His
point of departure, however, is Wechsler's insistence that constitutional interpretation is "all the doctrine can defensibly imply."3
A "Functional"Analysis
While in general agreement with the Bickel thesis that the
passive virtues are legitimate "because they make possible performance of the Court's grand function as proclaimer and protector of
goals,"3 1 Professor Scharpf has expressed the opinion that the political
question cannot be justified in the same manner.3 2 This is so because
the political question is uniquely distinguishable from other techniques of avoidance such as standing and ripeness.
In contrast to other "passive virtues," when the Court refuses to
decide an issue because it is political and leaves it for determination
by another department of government, its purpose is not to postpone decision until the time is ripe for a truly principled decision on
30
Other critics of the constitutional quality of the political question
include Maurice Finkelstein, who has recorded the following description of
the doctrine:
It [the political question] applies to all those matters of which the
court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or
inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency
will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a
decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from a feeling that the Court is incompetent to deal with the particular type of
question involved. Sometimes it will be induced by the feeling that
the matter is 'too high' for the courts. But always there will be a weighing
of considerations in the scale of political wisdom. Finkeistein, supra
note 7, at 344.
Mention should also be made of Mr. Field's laudable attempt to review
the political question cases; his conclusion was that "the true basis of a
political question is the lack of legal principles for the courts to apply in their
consideration of cases involving certain types of subject matter. . . ." Field,
The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MnwN. L. Rnv.
485, 513 (1924). The Field analysis has been labeled a "cognitive" theory of
the political question. Scharpf, supra note 19, at 555.
It has been said that a great variety of considerations, acting alone or in
various combinations, contribute to the conclusion that a question is political.
H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
192 (1953). Among these considerations the following are salient:
the inability of courts to secure facts necessary for decision; the need
for discretion in decision and the courts' inability to develop or apply
controlling principles of law; the superiority of political checks as guides to
decisions; the existence of special dangers, as for example in foreign relations of having the government speak with more than one voice; the
inability of courts to deal with the possible consequences of decision,
such as would follow, for example, a holding that an entire state government was unconstitutional; the push of express constitutional provisions;
etc., etc.
31 A. BICKLE, supra note 27, at 71.
32 Scharpf, supra note 19, at 534-35.
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the merits (as Bickel suggests). On the contrary, the Court relinquishes all responsibility to decide the issue, unless, of course, the
Court later overrules or distinguishes a political question? In
short the contention is that the political question doctrine cannot
be explained satisfactorily in terms of a procedural or jurisdictional
technique of avoidance.3 4
Instead, Professor Scharpf would explain the political question
"in functional terms, as the Court's acknowledgment of the limitations of the American judicial process.""5 He enumerates several
functional factors and considerations which, in various combinations,
are likely to convince the Court that decision of a particular issue
would transgress "the limits of its own responsibility.""6 The first
factor or consideration which may cause the Court to invoke the
political question doctrine is difficulty in gaining access to information."7 This factor may be manifest in cases dealing with foreign
affairs in which decision depends upon evaluation of a foreign factsituation, especially if relevant information is in the special competence of the executive department.
A second factor or consideration which may be germane in determining whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political question is the
need for uniformity of decision.38 This factor has been operative in
cases in which the Court has respected determinations by the political
departments establishing the duration of war. As a third factor,
Professor Scharpf lists deference by the Court to the wider responsibility of the political departments." This has been a salient factor
in many of the cases in which the Court has found the issue to be
political for the reason that judicial interference would be embarrasing to another branch of government.
33
The political question should also be distinguished from other rules
of self-restraint which the Court has, from time to time, imposed upon
itself. See for example the self-imposed rules enumerated by Brandeis, J.,
concurring in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). These rules have
a procedural quality, the thrust of which is to postpone decision of the
constitutional question that is raised.
34 Scharpf, supra note 19, at 535-38.
3" Id. at 566. Professor Scharpf defines the term "functional" to refer to
the "interrelationship between the nature of the task which the Court is performing and the means which it can employ for the performance of this task.
If its ordinary means prove inadequate for a particular task, the Court may
react either by enlarging its arsenal of means or by limiting the tasks which
it will3 perform." Id. at 523, n.21.
6 Id. at 567.
37

1d.

38
39

Id. at 573.
Id. at 578.
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On the other hand, the political question has not invariably
provided the technique by which the Court has seemingly deferred
to the wider responsibility of the political departments. Thus, in
Korematsu v. United States" a majority of the Court upheld the
exclusion of American citizens of Japanese extraction from designated
areas of the West Coast as a valid exercise of the war power, even
as applied to a citizen of Japanese extraction whose loyalty to the
United States was unquestioned. The Court rejected the contention

that it was sanctioning an obvious racial discrimination in violation
of the fifth amendment as well as the deprivation of other constitutional rights.'
A final consideration is characterized by Scharpf as the normative limitations of the political question. That is, except for the
cases in which the Court has applied the political question doctrine
to allow exclusion and deportation of aliens in spite of appealing
due process claims, the Court has refused to apply the doctrine to
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.42 So also has the doctrine been
held inapplicable when the Court was presented with "conflicting
claims of competence among the departments of the federal government, or between the federal government and the states."43
In regard to the Wechsler-Bickel dichotomy, Scharpf suggests
that the political question has provided a "touchstone for the
validity of competing theories of judicial review." 44 Concluding that
the doctrine cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of a
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Three justices filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Murphy said
the exclusion not only amounted to racial discrimination depriving persons
of Japanese ancestry of equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fifth
amendment but that "[it further deprives these individuals of their constitutional rights to live and work where they will, to establish a home where
they choose and to move about freely. In excommunicating them without
benefit of hearings, this order also deprives them of all their constitutional
rights to procedural due process." Id. at 235.
42 Scharpf, supra note 19, at 583-84. An additional qualification of this
generalization is suggested in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944). While agreeing with his fellow
dissenters that the military order directing the exclusion exceeded permissible
constitutional limits, Justice Jackson concluded that the civil courts should refuse to enforce such an order. He counseled against sustaining the order under
the due process clause, for to do so "is a far more subtle blow to liberty than
the promulgation of the order itself," and said that to lead the people to
rely on the Court for review was "wholly delusive." By intimating that
restraint should be imposed upon the military through the political processes
and not through the judicial process, Justice Jackson was favoring what
amounted to the political question doctrine; i.e., by refusing to adjudicate,
the Court
could avoid legitimating an order repugnant to the Constitution.
43
1d. at 585.
44
Scharpf, supra note 19, at 517.
40
41
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consistent interpretation of constitutional grants of power or as a
discretionary retreat to avoid an unprincipled decision, he advances
a "functional" explanation-acknowledgment by the Court of the
limitations of the judicial process. In support of this he adumbrates functional factors or considerations which have made the
acknowledgment necessary in a number of cases.
Conceding that the factors which Scharpf lists have been prominent in a number of cases, one wonders whether or not he has been
successful in divorcing the explanation from theories of judicial
review in the American system. If the bulk of the political question cases represents no more than an acknowledgment by the Court
of the limitations of the judicial system, perhaps Scharpf has done
little more than state a theory of judicial self-limitation.
As the debate over the meaning of the political question illustrates, the doctrine contains an evanescent quality which evades precise articulation. Evaluation of the doctrine is further complicated by
the staggering number of cases in which it has been involved. For
this reason exhaustive treatment of the cases, though desirable, is
beyond the scope of this article. Short of this, however, an effort
will be made to examine significant areas of the doctrine with
emphasis on current decisions.4"
SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE
Promulgationand Adoption of ConstitutionalAmendments
Coleman v. Miller" is noteworthy for its holding that the validity
of a state legislature's ratification of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution is a political question to be left to the determination of the Congress in exercising its control over the promulgation
of the adoption of amendments. Factually, the case revolved
around the child labor amendment which Congress had proposed
in 1924. The following year the Kansas Legislature adopted a
45 Limitations of time and space have made it necessary to eliminate

discussion of categories of the political question relating to the duration of
war, the legal status of Indian tribes, foreign affairs and the deportation of
aliens. For commentary on these subjects see, Note, Judicial Determination
of the End of War, 47 CoLtrM. L. Rnv. 255 (1947); Hudson, The Duration
of War Between the United States and Germany, 39 HARv. L. Rnv. 1020
(1926); PosT, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLeTICAL QUESnON 112-17
(1936); Dickinson, Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions,"
104 U. PA. L. REv. 451 (1956); Bullit, Deportation as a Denial of Substantive
Due Process, 28 WASH. L. REv. 205 (1953); Note, Resident Aliens and Due
Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VrtL. L. REv. 566 (1963).
46 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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resolution rejecting the proposed amendment, and a certified copy
of the resolution was sent to the United States Secretary of State.
Twelve years later-in 1937-the Kansas Legislature passed a resolution ratifying the proposed amendment by a narrow margin. There
was a tie vote in the state senate which was broken when the
presiding officer cast an affirmative vote.
Thereafter, members of both houses of the state Legislature
brought a mandamus proceeding in the state supreme court to
compel legislative officials to declare that the bill had not passed
and to restrain them from authenticating it. A majority of the United
States Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the writ by the highest
court in Kansas. Although the Court was divided to the point of
indecision with rspect to the question whether or not the power
of the Lieutenent Governor, as presiding officer of the state Senate,
to break a tie vote should be considered a political question, another
aspect of the political question was decisive. The Court said the
efficacy of the ratification was committed to Congress as part of
its authority in exercising its control over the promulgation of the
adoption of amendments.4"
It was argued that Congress, having set no time limit within which
the proposed amendment could be ratified, had in effect said that
ratification must take place within a reasonable time to be determined by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, was unpersuaded
and expressed concern that relevant criteria for making a judicial
determination were absent. 8 As the Court stated it: 9
In short, the question of a reasonable time in many cases
would involve . . an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic, which can hardly
be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an
extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial
notice as the basis of deciding a controversy. . . . On the other
hand, these conditions are appropriate for the consideration
of the political departments of Government. The questions they
involve are essentially political and not justiciable.
47

48

1d. at 450.

The Court said that in determining whether a question is political and
not justiciable, "the appropriateness under our system of government of
attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the
lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant consider-

ations."
Id. at 454-55.
4
9 Id. at 453-54.
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Notwithstanding the theme of judicial abstention in the majority
opinion, Mr. Justice Black in a concurring opinion criticized the
Court for not expressly disapproving the conclusion in an earlier
decision (Dillion v. Gloss)"0 that the Constitution impliedly required ratification of a proposed amendment within a reasonable
amount of time. The Court distinguished the Dillion case as
deciding only that Congress might fix a reasonable time for ratification, but Justice Black argued that it should be overruled. Characterizing the entire amendment process as political, he said the
process was subject to no judicial review because article V of the
Constitution grants power over the amending of the Constitution
to Congress alone. 1
To regard the reasonable time question as having complete immunity from judicial review seems the preferable position. In the
first place, the problem invites application of Professor Jaffe's
observation that for many problems "[wie may believe that the job
is better done without rules, or that even though there are applicable rules, these rules should be only among the numerous
relevant considerations." 52 Although little difficulty would be involved in devising rules defining a reasonable time, this problem
is one for which we do not want rules. As the Court pointed out,
a determination of the vitality of a proposed amendment requires
evaluation of a broad range of conditions in society. These give
rise to sharply contested issues of social policy (such as the child
labor law) which cut deeply into society and which are not always
susceptible to reasoned elaboration. Such issues are more appropriately resolved by the legislature whose members are directly
responsible to the electorate.
Secondly, there is a certain tension between the institution of
judicial review and the democratic principle of majority rule. To
the extent that judicial review is counter-majoritarian it is essentially undemocratic. 53 Thus, it is one thing to attempt to justify
50 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (congressional resolution proposing the eighteenth
amendment which contained a specification declaring the proposed amendment inoperative unless ratified within seven years held to be a reasonable
amount of time).
5 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 459 (1939) (Black, J. concurring).
5 Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAiv.
L. REv. 1265, 1303 (1961). Professor Bickel adopts the Jaffe formula in
developing his thesis. See A. BIcKEL, supra note 27, at 183-198.
51 For a discussion of whether or not judicial review is compatible with
democracy, see McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting
Opinion, 3 HousToN L. Rv. 354 (1966). The writer concludes that "tradi-
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judicial annulment of legislation as an expression of community
principle-the "sober second thought," as Bickel has put it-yet
it is entirely another thing to allow the Court to hold a reasonable
time has expired and thereby frustrate the very process by which
the community may wish to reverse what the Court has done.
On the other hand, to regard the entire amendment process as
being subject to no review is to ignore important functions which
the Court might legitimately perform. Redress for irregularities or
fraud in obvious disregard of explicit constitutional requirements
could be sought in court. For example, assuming there are no
questions concerning the efficacy of a state's ratification such as
were involved in Coleman v. Miller, if Congress should declare an
amendment adopted which plainly had not been approved by threefourths of the states as required by the Constitution, the Court's
doors should not be closed. Although the likelihood of such a
patent violation of the Constitution is improbable, the possibility of
judicial relief should not be foreclosed.54 The Court could declare
the amendment void or refuse to enforce it because approval of the
requisite number of states had not been secured. As the Court's
order would be framed in the negative, compliance would not present a significant problem.
When, however, one passes from the more outrageous violations
of article V, nice questions are presented. A potential problem is
illustrated by current attempts to secure applications of two-thirds of
the state legislatures requesting Congress to call a convention for
the purpose of proposing amendments in regard to the apportionment of state governments. Segments of the community, unhappy
tion, and sentiment, and some really spendid rhetoric, have blinded us to
'the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the
American democracy.' " Id. at 366.
54 A more likely situation would be a judicial contest of congressional
certification that three-fourths of the states had approved a proposed amendment. Assuming the approval is authenticated by the proper officers, what
evidence, if any, would be admissible to impeach their authentication? Two
early cases dealing with legislation cut in different directions. Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892) held that it is incompetent to show from committee
reports or the journals of either house of Congress that a bill, which was
signed by the presiding officers of each house and the President, was not
the one actually passed by the Congress. But cf. Gardner v. Barney, 73
U.S. (6 Wall) 499 (1868) in which the Court held it was proper to resort
to extrinsic evidence show that the date affixed to a bill signed by the
President was defective. "[Whenever a question arises in a court of law of
the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or of
the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called upon to decide it,
have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is
capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer
to such questions ...." Id. at 511 (dictum) (emphasis supplied).
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with the Court's conception of one-man, one-vote, have set into
motion the cumbersome amending process. If two-thirds of the
states should apply to Congress to call such a convention, would
the Court review a congressional refusal or failure to comply?
If the Court decides the merits, it must interpret the explicit
language of article V which uses the word "shall" in connection with
the duty of Congress to call such a convention. However, as the
Court's interpretation of the rendition clause of article IV, section 2
exemplifies, mandatory language is not always construed to create an
enforceable duty. 5 Thus, the Court might well hold that the congressional duty to call a convention is not used in the mandatory or
compulsory sense but is only declaratory of a moral duty created by
the Constitution. Such a construction would avoid a head-on confrontation with Congress and compliance problems growing out
of the affirmative action which a contrary construction might
necessitate.
On the other hand, the Court could accomplish the same result
by applying the political question and thus refusing to decide the
merits. Besides avoiding hostile confrontation with the legislative
branch, use of the political question would help preserve the prestige
and public confidence on which the Court's ultimate authority rests.
By refusing to legitimate or sanction congressional non-compliance
with a constitutional directive, the Court will emerge from the fray
unscarred and final solution of the question will be left to the
political processes.
The Politicsof the People: The Apportionment Cases
The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the swordultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment,
in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements.-Frankfurter,J., dissenting in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
267 (1962).

Considering the wide range of issues to which the political question
has been applied, it is not surprising that it should have raised its
head in suits to compel reapportionment where state legislative
and congressional representation was based on considerations other
than numerical equality at the ballot box. As the justiciability of
malapportionment claims has important social, political and economic consequences, this has proved to be one of the most active
and most controversial categories of the political question. Thus,
" Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
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it may be more than a matter of mere coincidence that the earliest
apportionment suits were commenced at the threshold of an era
in American history which subjected American institutions to a
serious re-evaluation.
After the 1930 census, approximately two-thirds of the states
were affected by congressional reapportionment. States with increasing and with decreasing populations were affected, and many
state legislatures were reapportioned. 6 Voters instituted suit challenging the new districts, and several of the cases ultimately reached
the Supreme Court.
In one of these cases the two houses of the Minnesota Legislature
had passed a congressional districting bill and had sent it to the
Governor who had returned it without approval. The Minnesota
constitution provided that a bill should become law upon approval
by the Governor or in the absence of his approval by two-thirds vote
of each House. Even though the necessary two-thirds approval had
not been obtained, the bill was deposited with the state Secretary
of State to become effective as law.
Alleging (1) that the bill had not been repassed by the Legislature
and (2) that the proposed congressional districts were not compact
and did not contain an equal number of inhabitants as required by
the congressional Reapportionment Act of 1929, the plaintiff sought
to enjoin all proceedings pursuant to the bill. The Supreme Court
held for the plaintiff on the ground that there is nothing in article
1, section 4 of the Constitution to allow a state legislature to enact
law except in accordance with the method set forth in its own
constitution."7
The Court was confronted with what in effect had been the
plaintiff's second contention in Wood v. Broom. 8 The 1911 congressional Reapportionment Act specified that each district should
have, among other things, as nearly as practicable the same number
of inhabitants, and a federal district court declared a Mississippi
statute invalid for failure to comply with this requirement. Reversing,
the Supreme Court held that the provision of the 1911 act relied
upon by the district court had expired and was not included in the
56

Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27
LAw 57
& CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962).
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). Accord, Carrol v. Becker, 285
U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
58 285 U.S. 1 (1932).
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1929 congressional Reapportionment Act. 9 Four justices, however,
thought the only ground for dismissing the bill was want of equity.
Precedent against the justiciability of apportionment claims continued to mount and reached its high water mark with the decision
of Colegrove v. Green.6" A divided Court dismissed a complaint
under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act for a decree declaring
Illinois' statutes apportioning the state into congressional districts
invalid on the theory that the districts lacked compactness of territory and approximate equality of population. The prevailing opinion
was written by Justice Frankfurter who thought Wood v. Broom
was controlling.6 ' Moreover, he hinted that lack of jurisdiction
was the basis for the decision because the Constitution grants to
Congress the exclusive authority to regulate congressional elections.
The actual ground of the decision, however, proceded on the assumption that the judiciary is incompetent to entertain claims based
on unequal voting power. Thus:
We are of the opinion that the appellants ask of this Court
what is beyond its competence to grant. [Such a demand on
judicial power] must be resolved by considerations on the
basis of which this Court, from time to time, has refused to
intervene in controversies. It has refused to do so because due
regard for the effective working of our Government revealed
this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore
not meet for judicial determination.
Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.62
At the heart of ColegroVe was Justice Frankfurter's conviction
that excessive reliance on courts weakens the responsibility of the
electorate in a democracy. One thought, more than any other,
permeates the opinion: "It is hostile to a democratic system to
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."6 "
In an opinion by Justice Black, three dissenters took a different
view of the role of courts in a democracy. The dissenters emphasized
that the plaintiffs lived in congressional election districts with popu59

Accord, Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
U.S. 549 (1946).
Three justices dissented, and one justice was of the opinion that the
bill should be dismissed for want of equity.
62 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946).
63
Id. at 553. For an article challenging both the legatlity and practicality of Colegrove, see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Courts,71 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1958).
60 328
61
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lations three to four times as great as other such districts; and that
state legislators were chosen on the basis of state election districts
apportioned in a manner similar to the congressional election districts, which had not been reapportioned for approximately forty
years. The interdependence between state and congressional apportionment made it in the self-interest of state legislators to perpetuate the inequalities in voting power. Given this situation, the
dissenters felt it was the duty of the Court to declare the existing
Illinois apportionment act "a wholly indefensible discrimination
against appellants and all other voters in heavily populated districts"
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Following the Colegrove decision, the Court continued to remain
aloof from the political thicket and dismissed a number of apportionment claims in short per curiam decisions." While reflecting the
Colegrove philosophy to a degree, an additional concept appeared to
justify non-intervention:
To assume that political power is a function exclusively of
numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government ...
It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court,
applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and
equal protection of the laws, to deny to a State the power
to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between
its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated
masses. . . . The Constitution-a practical instrument of
government-makes no such demands on the States.66
On the other hand, the same Court which declared nonjusticiable
malapportionment claims based on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment had considerably less difficulty striking down
racially motivated legislation which created a disparity in voting
power. Thus, Justice Frankfurter who wrote the opinion in Colegrove v. Green spoke for the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.67
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).
Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357
U.S. 916 (1958); Radford v. Gray, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless,
352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v.
Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952);
Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South
v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948);
Colegrove v. Barret, 330 U.S. 804 (1946); Cook v. Fortson (Turner v.
Duckworth), 329 U.S. 675 (1946). Only a few of these decisions were by
64

65

a unanimous
Court.
66 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1948).
67 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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The plaintiffs in Gomillion were Negro citizens who sought an
injunction in a federal district court in Alabama to restrain the enforcement of a state statute which altered the boundaries of the
city of Tuskegee. According to the allegations in the bill, the act
eliminated practically all of the city's 400 Negro voters without
eliminating any white voters, 8 and the plaintiffs argued that the
effect of the statute was to disenfranchise them solely for racial
reasons. More specifically, the alleged effect of the act was "to deprive
the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence
in Tuskegee, including, inter alia, the right to vote in municipal
elections."6 9 Reversing the district court's dismissal of the bill, the
Court said that if the allegations were proved, the effect of the act
would be to deprive Negroes of the right to vote on account of race
in violation of the fifteenth amendment.
Attempting to distinguish Colegrove v. Green, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that Colegrove involved a complaint based on
discriminatory apportionment of congressional districts in the form
of legislative inaction over a period of years resulting in a dilution
of the strength of the plaintiff's votes. In contrast, the complaint
in Gomillion centered around affirmative legislation which was racially inspired. As Justice Frankfurter expressed it:
In no case involving unequal weight in voting distribution that
has come before the Court did the decision sanction a differentiation on racial lines whereby approval was given to unequivocal
withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens. Apart from
all else, these considerations lift this controversy out of the
so-called "political" arena and into the conventional sphere of
constitutional litigation. 0

Although Gomillion did involve a kind of apportionment problem
in that the contested legislation in effect deprived the plaintiffs of
the right to vote in municipal elections, the distinction drawn by
Justice Frankfurter seems correct. In the first place, there was
7 1 while there
ample precedent in support of the result in Gomillion,
68 It was alleged that the act altered the shape of the city from a square
to an irregular twenty-eight sided figure.
69
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
70

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960).

71 Guinn

v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) and Myers v. Anderson,
238 U.S. 368 (1915) held so-called Grandfather clauses-statutes fixing the
qualifications of voters based on the right of the voter or his ancestor to
vote at a date prior to the adoption of the fifteenth amendment-void
because in violation of the fifteenth amendment. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927) the Court held unconstitutional under the equal protection
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was no precedent permitting justiciability where the sole claim was
numerical inequality in voting strength. Secondly, the force of
history presented an appealing argument for finding justiciability
in Gomillion while denying it in Colegrove: perhaps the principal
purpose behind the fifteenth amendment was enfranchisement and
legal equality for the Negro. Thirdly, judicial abstention in Colegrove could co-exist with judicial interference in Gomillion because
"apportionment is necessarily a very high percentage of politics with
a very small admixture of definable principle. In race relations the
proportions are reversed."72 For this reason the political question
was not even mentioned in the school segregation cases.7"
In this state of the art, the apportionment issue appeared to
have been placed beyond the competence of the federal judiciary.
There were few warnings in the Court's opinions that Baker v.
Carr4 was on the horizon. It should be noted, however, that a
majority of the Court had never been able to agree upon the
reasons for holding apportionment suits nonjusticiable. In addition,
only four of the judges who sat on the Court at the time Colegrove
v. Green was decided remained when Baker was argued, and two
of them-Justices Black and Douglas-had dissented in Colegrove.
Just prior to Baker these two justices had reiterated their positions
by way of a memorandum dissent in which they were joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan."5
Actually there was nothing new or innovating in the claim set
forth in the complaint in Baker. The Tennessee Constitution provided for representation in proportion to the number of qualified
clause of the fourteenth amendment a Texas statute making Negroes ineligible
to participate in a primary election of a political party. Speaking for the
Court Mr. Justice Holmes said, "[t]he objection that the subject matter of
the suit is political is little more than a play upon words." Id. at 540.
A majority of the Court in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
found that exclusion of Negroes from voting in a Democratic primary
election to select nominees for a general election constituted state action
in contravention of the fifteenth amendment, even though membership in the
party was limited to white persons by resolution of a state convention.
More recently, eight of nine members of the Court thought the fifteenth
amendment was violated because Negroes were not allowed to vote in
primary elections of a Texas county political organization which placed the
names of its nominees on the regular Democratic primary ballot. Terry v.
345 U.S. 461 (1953).
Adams,
7
2 A. BIcKEL, supra note 27, at 193.
73Id.

369 U.S. 196 (1962).
7"Hartsford v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958). (involving an attack on the
Georgia county unit system). See Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search
74

of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv.252.
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voters in the state. Suit was instituted in a federal district court in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the state legislature had failed to

apportion since 1901 and that the Supreme Court of Tennessee had
declined jurisdiction in a similar case. For these reasons plaintiffs
claimed denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment.
Agreeing that the claim presented a justiciable controversy, six
members of the Court amassed four separate opinions. Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan dissented. Although Mr. Justice Stewart in
his concurring opinion stressed that the Court decided only the

questions of jurisdiction, justiciability and standing, subsequent decisions have made it unequivocally clear that the political question

is no longer an impediment to justiciability in apportionment litiga76
tion.
7
6 After Baker, the Court, in a series of decisions, overturned the line of
cases dating from Smiley v. Hoin and Wood v. Broom in 1932. Thus, in
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), the Court struck down use of
Georgia's county unit system in primary elections for state-wide officers.
According to Mr. Justice Douglas, "jt]he conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to
the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing-one person, one vote." Id. at 381. In like manner the Court
invalidated a Georgia statute creating congressional districts because the
statute abridged the guarantee of article I, section 2 of the federal constitution, providing that congressmen shall be chosen "by the People of the
several States."
By 1964 the Court had come full circle, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) held the existing and two proposed apportionment plans allowing substantial variances between population and representation for the
Alabama Legislature unconstitutional. The dominant theme of the opinion
was, of course, equal protection: "We hold, that as a basic constitutional
standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses
of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."
Id. at 568 (emphasis supplied). As for the political question: "We are
cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally protected
rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less
of us." Id. at 566.
On the same day Reynolds v. Sims was decided-June 15, 1964-the
Court held the legislatures of five other states had been unconstitutionally
apportioned. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(Colorado); YMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (New York); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (Maryland);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (Virginia); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(Delaware). Shortly after these cases were decided, the Court found apportionments in nine additional states unconstitutional; they are reported
beginning at 378 U.S. 553.
But cf., Fortson v. Morris 385 U.S. 231 (1966), where the Court by a fivefour decision upheld a provision of the Georgia Constitution allowing members of the Georgia General Assembly to elect the governor in the event
no candidate receives a majority of the popular votes cast in a general
election. The Court refused to enjoin the Georgia Legislature from proceeding to elect a Governor even though the Legislature was malapportioned.
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In holding that the challenge to an apportionment presents no
nonjusticiable political question, Mr. Justice Brennan, who wrote the
majority opinion, found it necessary to review the contours of the
political question doctrine. He sidestepped the Colegroie v. Green
line of precedent upon which the district court had relied in dismissing the suit by saying "[t]he cited cases do not hold to the
contrary.""7 He said that a review of the cases revealed that in
the political question cases, "it is the relationship between the
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government,
and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which
gives rise to the 'political question.' , Furthermore, he listed a
number of variables which distinguish a political question and which,
at the same time, identify it as essentially a function of separation
of powers. As Mr. Justice Brennan expressed it:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the
ground of a political question's presence. 79
As Professor McCloskey has pointed out,"0 with the exception of
the formulation described as "a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," Brennan's primary emphasis is upon the
77
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). Brennan read Smiley v.
Holm and the other 1932 cases as having "settled the issue in favor of
justicability of questions of congressional redistricting," Such a reading
seems questionable as the only questions decided in these cases were the
applicability of the governor's veto power to a state redistricting and the
expiration of the voter numerical equality requirement in the 1911 conReapportionment Act.
gressional
78
1d. at 210.
7 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
80
McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 Htv. L. Rv.
54, 61 (1962).
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intra-federal relationship. Not only are the variables which he lists
concerned in the main with separation of powers at the federal level,
but the precedents he considers in fields such as foreign affairs,
duration of war and validity of enactments bear the same message.
Although Brennan does not expressly foreclose application of the
political question for want of judicially discoverable standards when
the federal judiciary's relationship to the states is involved, it seems
implicitly clear that this will seldom be an insuperable barrier. Thus,
in Baker such a contention was disposed of in one sentence, and no
breath was wasted on elaboration:
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to the courts
since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."?
More recently the Court in the Julian Bond case had little difficulty
discovering free speech standards by which actions of the Georgia
Legislature were invalidated.
Mr. Justice Brennan's treatment of the political question has
been praised for several reasons. First, some crystalization of such
an amorphous concept is desirable, and there is a strong implication that his list of specific elements which make an issue into a
political question is exclusive. Even if the list is not exclusive,
it has confined the doctrine to more manageable proportions.82
Secondly, as a by-product of enumerating the elements of the political
question, Mr. Justice Brennan has assembled the political question
cases with an orderliness of doctrine that previous majority opinions
lacked. 3 At the same time, however, he seems to have rejected
blanket application of the doctrine to any one broad area and to
have emphasized the need for case by case development. 4
On the other hand, this undertaking has not escaped criticism.
Thus, he has been accused of engaging in "a type of logomachical
legerdemain without squarely facing the more fundamental problem;
namely, the distinction between law and politics."85 Another comBaker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
See Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J.
64 (1962).
83 McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and
Equal
84Protection, 61 MICH. L. Rnv. 645 (1963).
Emerson, supra note 82.
85
Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. DET. L.J 439, 441
(1965).
81

12
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mentator has advanced a similar observation, although in more
practical language: "The Court seems to have decided justiciability
in such a generalized context as to amount to judicial adventuring
on the high seas of politics with no assurance of a safe return to
shore."86 Perhaps the most stinging criticism, however, was voiced
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter who was of the opinion that the Court's
decision not only reversed a "uniform course of decision established
to a "massive repudiation of the
by a dozen cases" but amounted
8' 7
experience of our whole past."
Part of the past experience Justice Frankfurter thought the Court
had repudiated was the Colegrove doctrine. While admitting there
had been no unanimity of agreement on the reasoning behind Colegrove, he said that the political question in the Colegrove-Baker
type of case embodied a confluence of the following considerations:
(1) a concern with avoiding involvement of the judiciary in matters
traditionally left to legislative policy; (2) difficulty of devising judicial standards to determine the precise role of numerical equality in
the allocation of political power; (3) difficulty of finding appropriate
kinds of relief. Each of these considerations converged to make
the Colegrove-Baker kind of controversy nonjusticiable. "To classify the various instances as 'political questions' is rather a form
stating this conclusion than a revealing of analysis." 88
Emanating from his dissenting opinion was the Frankfurter
philosophy of complete judicial detachment from the politics of the
people. To embroil the Court in the apportionment controversy
would be "hostile to a democratic system" 89 because apportionment
lies at the heart of the political process.
Apportionment . . . [involves] considerations of geography,

demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions like the
lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of
settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience
and senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling
relevant data, and a host of others."'
86

Dixon, supra note 56, at 355.

87 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962)

(Frankfurter, J., dissent-

88 Id. at 280-81.
89 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946).
90 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
As Professor Bickel has put it, "apportionment is a very high percentage of
politics with a small admixture of definable principles." A. BicKEL, supra note
27, at 193.
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Factors such as these make apportionment extraordinarily complexso complex that equal protection provides no clear guide for judicial
examination.
The Court simply had no answer for this argument, and it is suggested that the Frankfurter position is the preferable one. In the
first place, precedent dating from Colegrove v. Gr'een called for
rejection of apportionment suits. Moreover, there was no compelling
historical justification for making representation proportional to
population; and what justification there was had not been initiated
at the behest of the judiciary.9 ' Secondly, conceding that the flexible
language of equal protection lends itself to a formula of equality in
numbers, there are still other relevant considerations-to return
to Professor Jaffe's formula. Even though equal representation of
qualified voters may be an ideal of American democracy, our political
institutions have invariably found it necessary to compromise the
ideal to conform with the practicalities of political life.
Different groups, regions and interests clamor for recognition.
Strength of political parties depends to a degree upon which group
of voters wields the most power at the polls. In short, the apportionment question is too "high," and "too nakedly power-oriented, and
perhaps too explosive for judicial control.""2 By using the political
question the Court can refrain from blessing or legitimating "the
' Correction
expedient arrangements made by political institutions." 93
of these arrangements should be initiated at the grass roots levelby the people who exert ultimate control in a democracy.
The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government
For more than a century article IV, section 4 of the Constitution,
guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government, has
consistently been held not to be enforceable through the courts.
The grandfather of this long line of cases is Luther v. Borden,9"
which grew out of Dorr's rebellion of 1841. As the 1633 Charter
of Rhode Island contained no provision for amendment and allowed
only limited suffrage, dissatisfied citizens elected representatives to
attend a constitutional convention, which, in turn, drew up a pro"' Representation proportional to population was not a prevalent practice in colonial times, at the time the Constitution was adopted, or at the
time the fourteenth amendment became part of the Constitution; nor
was it employed by a large number of states at the time Baker v. Carr
was argued. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
92 McCloskey, supra note 80, at 62.
93
94

A BICKEL, supra note 27, at 194.

48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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posal for a new state government. The new government was adopted
by a majority vote of the adult male population, and its Governorelect Dorr tried unsuccessfully to uphold its authority by force.
Thereafter, issue was joined in a trespass action on the question
whether or not officials of the charter government had acted pursuant to martial law to suppress an insurrection against the state
government. Thus, the ultimate issue was which of the two competing
governments was legitimate and lawful. Describing the question as
political, the Supreme Court refused to decide the matter.
The Court pointed out that the guarantee clause guaranteed to
each state not only a republican form of government but protection
against domestic violence upon application of the legislature or the
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened). In accordance
with the latter guarantee, the Congress had enacted a statute in
1795 empowering the President to curb insurrection within a state
upon request by the proper state governmental authority. Thus, the
President would necessarily have to determine which government
was legitimate before he could exercise his statutory power. As
events would have it, the militia was not summoned in the Luther
case, although the President did in fact recognize the Governor of
the charter government. The Court bowed to the President's decision and declared that the political departments had the sole power
to determine which of the two competing state governments was
legitimate.95
Although the actual holding of the Luther case was rather narrow,
the decision has been the cornerstone in the development of a line
of decisions establishing the principle that the federal courts will
not enforce guarantee clause claims. Particularly important has been
the following dictum:
Under [the guarantee clause] it rests with Congress to decide
what government is the established one in a State. .

.

. Con-

gress must necessarily decide what government is established
in the State before it can be determined whether it is republican
or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the
government under which they are appointed, as well as its
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional
authority. And its decision is binding on every other department
95 See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4:. A
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MmN. L. REv. 513 (1962).
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of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal.96
This dictum has been taken for granted in a number of decisions,9" notably Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon9 8 After the
Oregon Constitution was amended in 1902 to provide for the initiative and referendum, the initiative was used in 1906 to enact a law
taxing certain classes of corporations. In a proceeding brought by
the state to enforce the tax, the taxpayer's two principal contentions
were that the initiative and referendum violated the guarantee of a
republican form of government and that the tax measure was forbidden by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court reasoned that the taxpayer's sole objection to the tax
was based on its guarantee clause claim and therefore the matter
was nonjusticiable on the authority of Luther v. Borden.
One could read the Pacific States decision rather narrowly to
mean only that the republicanism of a mode of statutory enactment
cannot be asserted as a defense to resist enforcement of the statute
created under it.99 Such an interpretation, however, has been rejected as subsequent decisions demonstrate, and the Pacific States
decision has bulked large in a number of instances where efforts
have been made to enforce the guarantee clause. More specifically,
the Court has declared all issues raised under the guarantee clause
to be political primarily on the authority of Pacific States; ,' enforcement of the guarantee is said to be for the Congress and not for the
Courts.
In contrast with the central role played by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment in decisions of the present
Court such as the school segregation decisions and the reapportionment decisions, the Court in Pacific States regarded the taxpayer's
96
Luther
97

v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
During the Reconstruction era the Court refused to enjoin the operation of statutes dividing former confederate states into military districts.
As such matters affected the structure of a state's government, they were
political and not justiciable. See e.g., Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
98
223 U. S. 118 (1912).
99
Bonfield, supra note 95.
10 See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612
(1937) (attack on a statute establishing a state commission to regulate the
licensing, sales, prices and market areas of milk producers held nonjusticiable);
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80
(1930) (challenge to a constitutional provision requiring the concurrence
of all but one of the justices on the state supreme court to invalidate a statute
held nonjusticiable); other cases in which attacks based on guarantee clause
have been declared nonjusticiable are collected in Bonfield, supra note 95.
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equal protection claim as mere surplusage. In like manner the
Court in Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1)"0 avoided an alleged
due process violation on rather technical grounds. The Kentucky
Board of Election Commissioners declared two candidates-Taylor
and Marshall-in a general election to have been elected Governor
and Lieutenant Governor respectively. After they had been inducted
into office, Goebel and Beckham, the opposing candidates, contested
the election in the state's General Assembly, which the state constitution gave them the right to do, and the General Assembly
awarded the election to them.
Shortly after the oath of office was administered, Goebel died
and Beckham succeeded him as Governor. Beckham thereafter
successfully sought a judgment of ouster against Taylor and Marshall
in the state courts. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
it was alleged that because the General Assembly had acted without
evidence the judgment of ouster deprived Taylor and Marshall of
due process of law and deprived the people of Kentucky of a
government republican in form. The Court rejected the due process
claim on the ground that an office in a state government was not
property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment; as for
the latter2 claim, the Court felt that Luther v. Borden was con10
trolling.
It is quite probable that the outcome in the Taylor case would
be different if it were decided by the present Court. In the first
place, the Court in Taylor seems to have applied Luther almost
indiscriminately without regard to what Luther did or said. Actually,
the Luther Court abstained from deciding which of two competing
governments was legitimate, and its dicta declared that Congress
determines whether or not a state has a republican form of government by admitting Senators and Representatives to " the councils
of the Union." If Congress determines a state's republicanism by
seating its elected Representatives, it is difficult to see how Luther
applies to the validity of a gubernatorial election. Neither the
holding nor dicta in Luther embraces the manner in which a state
governor is chosen.
Secondly, separation of powers between the federal judiciary
and the states is no longer a formidable barrier to justiciability.
Writing for the Court in Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan was at pains
to emphasize that it is the federal judiciary's relationship to co101 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
102

Three justices dissented.
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ordinate branches of the federal government that creates a political
question. Since Baker, the Court's review of the Georgia Legislature's
action in refusing to seat a newly elected member supplies further
evidence that the federal judiciary's relationship to the states will not
give rise to a political question.
In his dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, Justice Frankfurter
analyzed many of the guarantee clause cases, although the Taylor
case was not among them. He concluded that the combination of
three discernible principles was responsible for the proposition that
guarantee clause claims are nonjusticiable, namely: (1) refusal to
decide when standards meet for judgment were lacking; (2) noninterference with state governmental matters in the absence of a
clear mandate (such as the fifteenth amendment's mandate in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot); (3) abstention from broad issues of political
organization. Justice Frankfurter thought each of these elements
was present in the Baker case and argued that the claim in Baker
was, in effect, "a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label. .

.

. [W]here judicial competence is wanting, it cannot

be created by invoking one clause of the Constitution rather than
another. "3
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, on the other hand, purported
to leave the guarantee cluase cases undisturbed. Differing with
Justice Frankfurter, he stated that, "it is the involvement in Guaranty
Clause claims of the elements thought to define 'political questions,'
and no other feature, which could render them nonjusticiable.
Specifically, . . . such claims are not held nonjusticiable because

they touch matters of state governmental organization."' 0 4 Notwithstanding statements such as these, the substance of the complaint in
Baker-that representation based on geographical units without
regard to numerical equality violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment-is practically indistinguishable from
a charge that the Tennessee government is not republican in form.' °5
Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"04Id. at 229. It has been observed that "[tjhe Brennan-Frankfurter
dichotomy was a salient illustration of Llewellyn's notion of 'lecways'-that
is, . . . that the choice of applicable precedents to govern current cases,
is one of the principal leeways of the law." Rosenblum, Justiciability and
lustice: Elements of Restraint and Indifference, 15 CATH. U.L. REv. 141,
146 (1966); K. LLEwELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRAcTICE 120 (1962).
'o According to one commentator, "the net conclusion of . . . [Brennan's] opinion seems to be that the issue presented in Baker v. Carr is
justiciable when presented under the equal protection clause, but nonjusticiable when raised under the guarantee." Bonfield, Baker v. Carr:
New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government,
50 CALI. L. REv. 245 (1962).
103
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That is, it is difficult to see how the Court could decide the equal
protection issue without considering the republican form issue as
a preliminary question for the reason that what violates equal
protection depends upon the frame of government being used. As
Justice Frankfurter put it, "since 'equal protection of the laws' can
only mean an equality of persons standing in the same relation to
whatever governmental action is challenged, the determination
whether treatment is equal presupposes a determination concerning
the nature of the relationship.'" 6
Thus, in deciding Baker and subsequent apportionment decisions,
the Court has in a sense defined a government republican in form.
The Court has carried over to the ballot box the aspiration of American democracy that every person counts one. Having done this, the
next step may well be specific judicial enforcement of guarantee
clause claims. Witness, a recent statement by Justice Fortas:'
They [the voting rights cases and apportionment cases] represent
...an acknowledgment that the republican form of government
guaranteed by the Constitution, read in light of the General
Welfare Clause, the guarantees of equal protection of the law
and the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, requires something more than an adherence to form.
It is reasonable to say, however, that judicial enforcement of the
guarantee of a republican form of government would be an undesirable extension of judicial power. Such an extension would be undesirable not because of the impossibility of finding judicial standards, for in deciding equal protection claims in the apportionment
cases the Court has, in effect, crossed this hurdle. Instead, nonjusticiability of republican guarantee claims should be dictated by
other relevant considerations. As indicated above, there is an interrelation between a state's scheme of representation and its frame
of government. Hence, much of the criticism which was aimed at
the Court's holding malapportionment claims justiciable is applicable here.
The form of a state's government involves potentially explosive
and power-packed issues which cut deep into the heart of American
political institutions. For the Court to regulate the structure of a
state's government would be "hostile to a democratic system";
judicial regulation would deprive the people of an important func106 Baker v. Carr, 369
1*7 Fortson v. Morris,

U.S. 186, 301 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
385 U.S. 231, 249 (1966), (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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tion in a democracy. A related consideration, moreover, concerns
the division of sovereignty between nation and states in our federal
system. As power to determine the structure of government is one
of the essential attributes of sovereignty, due regard for the role of
state government in an effective, viable federal system compels
judicial non-intervention.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Baker v. Carr perhaps the most important generalization
one could make about the political question was that there was no
readily ascertainable test for determining whether or not a matter
was justiciable. It was, in a sense, a conclusion that followed from
the weighing of various policy considerations concerning the appropriateness of judicial review."°8 Although an attempted enumeration of these considerations would be incomplete, three underlying
ideas have been dominant in the application of the political question;' 9 each idea has had its own independent impact while at the
same time converging and overlapping with one or both of the other
two.

First, is the idea that the Court should not interfere with matters
which because of their nature or because of express constitutional
language are committed to or are clearly the prerogative of one of
the political departments of government. In point is Coleman v.
Miller."0 Chief Justice Hughes' opinion, which was accepted by only two other members of the Court, asserted that the nature of the
question before the Court-whether ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment was valid--committed it to the determination
of Congress. Because appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic, was involved, the question
was essentially political and better suited for Congress. Justice
Black, on the other hand, in a concurring opinion which was joined
by three other justices, said that Article V of the Constitution granted "power over the amending of the Constitution to Congress
alone.""' So exclusive was this power that the amending process was
"'political' in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution.... ,2
'

08

See Taylor, Legal Action to Enjoin Legislative Malapportionment:

The Political Question Doctrine, 34 So. CALiF. L. REv. 179 (1961).
,09 These ideas are discussed in McCloskey, supra note 80, at 61.
110307 U.S. 433 (1939).

111 Id. at 459 (Black, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 458 (Black, J., concurring).
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The cases dealing with foreign relations-the area where the political question has traditionally been given emphasis-also express
this idea in various ways. Thus, in the cases involving recognition
of governments, jurisdiction over territory, boundary determinations
and abrogation and violations of treaties, the Court emphasized that
judicial inquiry was withheld because the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the political departments
of government. In addition, the very nature of many of the foreign
affairs issues has been a significant factor. For example, the Court
has recognized the need for uniform decisions in the conduct of
international relations:. ..
If this were not the rule, cases might often arise in which, on
the most important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there
would be an irreconcilable difference between the executive and
judicial departments. By one of the departments a foreign
island or country might be considered at peace with the United
States; whilst the other would consider it in a state of war. No
well regulated government has ever sanctioned a principle so
unwise, and so destructive of national character.
The need to speak with one voice only is sometimes said to be
necessary in order to avoid the danger of embarrassment abroad.
Certainly this was a factor in Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman," 4 in which the Court refused to review the validity of a Civil
Aeronautics Board decision on the ground that judicial intervention
might prove embarrasing to the President in executing foreign policy.
The Waterman case, moreover, illustrates yet another consideration
which sometimes contributes to the Court's conclusion that a matter
is beyond the realm of judicial competence because committed to
another branch of government, namely: the inability of the Court to
acquire information necessary for decision. As Justice Jackson expressed it: I'
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to
the world. It would be intolerable that courts without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of
the Executive taken on information properly held secret.
113 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
114 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
'Is Id. at 111.
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Of course this factor has not been without significance in domestic
disputes.'"
A second idea which has run through the political question has
been the Court's inability to develop or to apply principles of law.
To put it another way, "standards meet for judicial judgment" have
sometimes been said to be lacking;' '7 some situations have been
thought to be judicially unmanageable. This idea has been prevalent
in the apportionment cases in which the Court has felt incompetent
or ill
equipped to render decision because apportionment involves
the weighing of such factors as geography, economics and the urbanrural conflict. Thus, complaints with legislative districting could
not be addressed to the courts. Instead, "[a]ppeal must be to an
informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society .. .
relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears
the conscience of the people's representatives.""'
Inequities in
representation should not be corrected by the judiciary because
such a practice deprives the people of an important function in
a democracy.
Related to the idea of lack of judicial standards is a third idea
of judicial non-intervention where the organization of a government
forms the basis of the complaint. This idea has frequently been reflected in the guarantee clause cases. Thus, in the Pacific States case
the Court said that the taxpayer's attack was "not on the tax as a
tax, but on the State as a State. It is addressed to the framework and
political character of the government by which the statute levying the
tax was passed.""' 9 In cases such as this one, the Court has refused
to administer relief because of the fear, whether real or supposed,
of the consequences that might follow from a holding that a state
government is not republican in form. That is, the Court has been
afraid that such a decision would invalidate all state laws and create
a state of general lawlessness.' 20
The sum of these two concepts-non-intervention when "standards meet for judicial judgment" are lacking and when the organiza6

See e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) where the
Court said: "Mhe question of a reasonable time in many cases would
involve . . . an appraisal of . . . conditions . . .which can hardly be said
to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of
justice and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of judicial
authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy. ..."
"17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 289 (1962), (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" 8 1Id. at 270.
1,9 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912).
' 20 Id. at 141-42; Luther v. Borden 48 U.S.223
(7 How.) 1, 38-39 (1849).
"
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tion or framework of a government is in question----"amounts to
respect, either prudential of normative in origin, for the arrangements the political process has worked out for shaping the political
process..21 Baker v. Carr and subsequent decisions, however, have
made it clear that it is the relationship between the federal judiciary
and the coordinate branches of the federal government and not the
judiciary's confrontation with the states which gives rise to the
political question, with the possible exception of situations in which
there is an absence of judicially discoverable standards. The
standards problem, however, was dismissed in Baker by the simple
statement that "[jiudicial standards under the Equal Protection
Clause are well developed and familiar.

."'"

Having thus settled

the issue of justiciability, the Court wasted little time in reading
the democratic ideal of one person, one vote into the elastic language
of equal protection, while at the same time paying lip service to
the guarantee clause cases. Yet, by insuring numerical equality in
voting, the Court has in one sense determined what frame of government is proper because equality under the equal protection clause
cannot be defined without reference to the frame of government
being employed.
The short of it is that respect for federalism and the principle
of separation of powers as between the federal judiciary and the
states have been subordinated to concepts of individual liberty and
equality for which the Court claims to have no difficulty discovering
standards. Thus in the Julian Bond case the Court did not hesitate
to review the action of the Georgia Legislature in determining the
qualifications of a prospective member and to hold the Georgia
Legislature's
action an unconstitutional interference with free
1 23
speech.
On the other hand, there is less likelihood that the Court would
review the action of either house of Congress in disciplining or
refusing to seat a member. At least this would seem a fair implication
to be drawn from the stress placed on the intrafederal character of
the political question by Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr. Apparently, the Court will invoke the political question where the
doctrine otherwise would not be used in order to avoid confrontation
with Congress. In addition, the push of express constitutional language favors the political question. Article I, section 5 of the Con121 McCloskey, supra note 80, at 62.
122
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
123 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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stitution is quite clear in saying that "[e]ach House shall be the
Judge of the ...

Qualifications of its own Members .

.

. and may

. . . punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
Recent House activities disciplining Representative Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. for alleged misconduct invite attention. The House
denied Powell his seat pending an investigation by a special Select
Committee. In its concluding report, the Committee recommended,
among other things, that Powell be seated and publicly censured
by the Speaker of the House and that he be fined to repay government funds he was alleged to have misused. The House, however,
rejected the Committee's report and denied Powell his seat by a
two-thirds vote, although the Speaker in calling the vote said that
only a majority was necessary.
Powell has sought relief in the federal courts, and the case has
now reached the Supreme Court.' 4 One of Powell's grievances is
the Speaker's failure to call for a two-thirds vote. He also alleges
that he was denied his seat for racial reasons. Undoubtedly, the
racial claim will tempt the Court to decide the case on the merits,
as it can be argued that a holding of nonjusticiability will be viewed
as tacit judicial approval of racial discrimination by the House of
Representatives in regard to the qualifications of one of its members.
A further factor in Powell's favor is the fact that the Court in the
Bond case seemed to approve the Hamilton-Madison view that the
qualifications of legislators as defined and fixed by the Constitution
cannot be altered.' 25
Having said all these things, still it is likely that the Supreme
Court will apply the political question and refuse to decide Powell's
case. Although Powell is seeking a seat that was denied to him
after a regular congressional election, in terms of years of service
he was one of the senior members of the House. Article I, section
5 of the Constitution clearly states that the House by two-thirds
vote may expel a member for "disorderly [b]ehaviour," and no
restrictions are placed on the expulsion power. Apparently, a
124The federal district court and the circuit court of appeals have
refused to decide the merits of Powell's case. Powell v. McCormack, 266
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1968), affd, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1968). Although the Congress
has recently seated Powell, he is prosecuting his appeal in the Supreme Court.
The case is not altogether moot because payment of the fine has not been
forgiven and Powell's seniority has not been reinstated.
125 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 (1966).
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member may be expelled for any reason. If judicial abstention seems
inconsistent with the Bond case, the explanation for the difference
is that separation of powers remains an operative factor where the
Court confronts one of its peers-the Congress or the President.
Results such as the one projected in the Powell case, however,
will not be common, for decisions such as Baker and Bond have a
clear message: the significance of the political question as a curb
on justiciability has been reduced substantially, and its prestige has
been dealt a severe blow; no longer will it occupy the seat of honor
among the techniques of avoidance.
In a broader context the demise of the political question has
paralleled the activist tendencies of the present Court in its zealous
protection of individual rights. Of course those who would cast the
political question aside in order to protect individual rights see a
strong constitutional duty to adjudicate. Only a small percentage of
the political question cases, however, can be explained solely in
terms of the Court's duty to say what the law is in accordance with
the admonition in Marbury v. Madison. As Professor Bickel has
suggested, the political question "resists being domesticated" in such
a fashion, for there has been "something greatly more flexible"
about it;'26 the doctrine is indicative of the discretion that has
accompanied the exercise of judicial review.
Whether or not these ingredients of flexibility and discretion have
been coupled with an equal dosage of prudence depends in the
final analysis upon one's philosophy of judicial review. To explain
the doctrine "in functional terms, as the Court's acknowledgment of
the limitations of the American judicial process" 12 really does no
more because the limits of the process depend in large measure
upon one's conception of the judiciary's role in our constitutional
scheme.
Viewed in this context, the political question has been a useful
tool for allowing the Court to dispose of issues, such as apportionment of governments, for example, which are inappropriate for
judicial decision. Prior to Baker the Court had steadfastly rejected
apportionment suits; furthermore, there was a dearth of historical
justification for making representation proportional to population.
Yet, in the face of its own precedent and despite the absence of
126
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Bickel, supra note 26, at 46.
Scharpf, supra note 19, at 567.
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compelling historical justification, the Court has been able to find
the political ideal of representation according to numerical equality
written into the vague contours of equal protection to the extent that
it is legally enforceable. Accordingly, one is inescapably confronted
with Justice Frankfurter's charge that what the Court has done "is
to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately,
,28
really among competing theories of political philosophy ....
Reform in matters such as these should come from the political
branches-from the people striving "however blindly and inarticulately, toward their own conception of the Good Life." '29 If brave
new worlds are to be ushered in, the responsibility for their creation
does not lie with the judiciary. In placing responsibility for such issues
where it properly belongs and in limiting the judiciary to the decision
of cases and controversies, the political question has performed a
valuable function. The doctrine affirms Alexander Hamilton's observation that the judiciary from the nature of its functions should
be "the least dangerous [branch] to the political rights of the
Constitution."'"o

128

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

129 L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 105-06 (3d ed. Dillard 1960).
0
13 A. HAmILTON, THE FEDERALIST (1961 ed.).
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